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Being	  Reasonable,	  Becoming	  Plural:	  The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  the	  Sovereign	  
Return	  	  
Stewart	  Motha	  	  	   Spectres	  haunt	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  South	  Africa.	  Law	  is	  deeply	  implicated	  in	  constituting	   and	   sustaining	   the	   structures	   and	   practices	   of	   the	   colonial	   and	  apartheid	  regimes.	  Despite	  this	  legacy,	  law	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  transformation	  and	  renewal.	   The	   constitutional	   dispensations	   of	   1994	   and	  1996	   expressed	   a	   great	  faith	   in	   law	   –	   especially	   in	   ‘the	   law	   of	   the	   law’.1	   	   	   The	   early	   transformative	  metaphors	   of	   the	   ‘book’	   and	   the	   ‘bridge’	   in	   the	   Epilogue	   to	   the	   interim	  constitution	  evidence	  the	  aspiration	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	   fundamental	   law	  and	  constitutional	  supremacy	  would	  help	  a	  fractured	  and	  wounded	  polity	  to	  turn	  the	  page,	  ‘open	  a	  new	  chapter’,	  and	  journey	  to	  a	  new	  social	  and	  political	  order.2	  The	   abandonment	   of	   parliamentary	   sovereignty	   in	   favour	   of	   constitutional	  supremacy	  placed	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  its	  custodians	  –	  judges	  –	  at	  the	  apex	  of	  the	  juridico-­‐political	   order.	   	   It	   can	   of	   course	   be	   argued	   that	   this	   dispensation	  was	  arrived	  at	  through	  a	  representative	  and	  deliberative	  process	  where	  an	  assembly	  of	   the	   peoples’	   delegates	   constituted	   a	   new	   order,	   which,	   through	   democratic	  means,	   posited	   the	   constitution	   as	   supreme.	   This	   reflects	   a	   feature	   of	   many	  modern	   liberal	   constitutional	   orders	   that	   claim	   to	   logically	   sustain	   the	   tension	  between	  constitutional	  supremacy	  and	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  ‘people’,	  or	  indeed	  to	   sustain	   a	   productive	   tension	   about	  where	   sovereignty	   is	   located.3	   This	   very	  liberal	  story	  is	  replete	  with	  tensions	  and	  contradictions	  –	  ones	  that	  are	  amplified	  and	  potentially	   unsustainable	   and	  undesirable	   in	   the	   South	  African	   setting.	   	   In	  this	  essay	  I	  consider	  aspects	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  constitutional	  supremacy	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  neoliberal	  governance.	  I	  contrast	  this	  with	  approaches	  to	  plurality	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  J	  Derrida,	  ‘The	  Laws	  of	  Reflection:	  Nelson	  Mandela,	  in	  Admiration’	  in	  J	  Derrida	  and	  M	  Tlili	  (eds.)	  For	  Nelson	  Mandela	  (1987)	  2	  AJ	  van	  der	  Walt,	  “Dancing	  with	  Codes	  –	  Protecting,	  Developing	  and	  Deconstructing	  Property	  Rights	  in	  a	  Constitutional	  State”	  (2001)	  118	  South	  African	  Law	  Journal	  258	  at	  259;	  M	  Antaki,	  ‘The	  Bridge	  and	  The	  Book’	  in	  K	  van	  Marle	  and	  S	  Motha	  (eds.)	  (forthcoming),	  Genres	  of	  Critique:	  
Aesthetics	  and	  Liminality	  in	  Post-­Apartheid	  Jurisprudence. 3	  P	  Kahn,	  Political	  Theology:	  Four	  New	  Chapters	  in	  the	  Concept	  of	  Sovereignty.	  (2011)	  8-­‐17.	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can	  inform	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  more	  consistent	  with	  the	  aspiration	  of	  renewing	  the	  social	  and	  juridical	  order.	  	  	   Neoliberal	  governance	  exhibits	  a	  strong	  preference	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  experts,	  the	  accountability	  and	  predictability	  of	  rules,	  and	  the	  subjection	  of	  state	  power	  to	  judicial	  control.	  Private	  power	  and	  the	  exigencies	  of	  capital	  face	  relatively	  few	  constraints.4	   Democratic	   and	   parliamentary	   forms	   of	   accountability	   and	   state	  institutions	   are	   viewed	   as	   overly	   bureaucratic	   centres	   of	   potential	   corruption.	  The	   ‘rule	   of	   law’	   is	   thus	   posited	   as	   an	   unrivalled	   good	  when	   compared	   to	   the	  ‘will’	   of	   sovereign	  authorities	  whether	   that	   is	   located	   in	   an	  office,	   assembly,	   or	  population.	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  should	  not	  be	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  a	  constitutionally	  delimited	  state.	  The	  problem	  is	  rather	  one	  of	  considering	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  sovereign	  ‘will’	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  plural	  existence.	   My	   approach	   regards	   plural	   existence	   as	   ontologically	   prior	   to	   the	  possibility	  of	   rule-­‐governed	  existence.	  Plurality	  precedes	   the	  rule	  of	   law	  rather	  than	  following	  in	  its	  wake.	  This	  is	  an	  approach,	  I	  submit,	  that	  is	  far	  more	  apt	  for	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  and	  post-­‐apartheid	  polity	  which	  struggles	  to	  be	  born	  in	  South	  Africa.	   It	   is	   an	   argument	   I	   advance	   by	   considering	   the	   South	   African	  Constitutional	   Court’s	   decision	   in	  Albutt	   v	   Centre	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Violence	   and	  
Reconciliation	  and	  others.5	  	  
1	   Being	  Reasonable	  	  
1.1	   Rationalising	  the	  Pardon	  Power	  	   In	  Albutt	  the	  applicants	  challenged	  the	  power	  of	  the	  President	  to	  grant	  a	  pardon	   pursuant	   to	   s.	   84	   (2)(j)	   of	   the	   Constitution	   to	   people	  who	   claim	   to	   be	  convicted	   of	   offences	  with	   a	   political	  motive.	   The	   powers	   and	   functions	   of	   the	  President	  are	  set	  out	  in	  s.	  84	  –	  and	  includes	  the	  responsibility	  for	  ‘pardoning	  or	  reprieving	  offenders	  and	  remitting	  any	  fines,	  penalties	  or	  forfitures’	  (s.	  84	  (2)(j)).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See	  David	  Harvey,	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Neoliberalism	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005)	  discussed	  below.	  5	  [2010]	  CCT	  54/09	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The	  question	  regarding	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  pardon	  power	  framed	  by	  the	  parties	  to	   this	  dispute	  and	   the	  Constitutional	  Court	  was	  whether	   the	  President,	  before	  granting	   a	   pardon	   to	   a	   group	   of	   convicted	   prisoners,	   is	   required	   to	   afford	   the	  victims	  of	  the	  offences	  a	  hearing.	  The	  dispute	  was	  essentially	  between	  ‘the	  state’	  in	   the	   form	   of	   the	   President	   and	   the	   Minister	   for	   Justice	   and	   Constitutional	  Development,	  and	  a	  coalition	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  (NGOs)	  whom,	  amongst	   other	   things,	   represented	   victims	   of	   offences	   committed	   by	   those	  potentially	  benefitting	  from	  a	  pardon.	  	   The	  background	  to	  the	  case	  is	  as	  follows.	  In	  a	  speech	  to	  a	  joint-­‐sitting	  of	  Parliament	   on	   21st	   November,	   2007	   President	   Mbeki	   announced	   the	   special	  dispensation	   for	   people	   convicted	   of	   politically	   motivated	   offences.	   The	  dispensation	  was	   aimed	   at	   dealing	  with	   the	   ‘unfinished	   business’	   of	   the	   Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  (the	  TRC),	  including	  the	  question	  of	  amnesty	  for	  those	  who	  had	  not	  participated	  in	  the	  TRC	  process.	  The	  process	  adopted	  by	  the	  President	  included	  setting	  up	  a	  multi-­‐party	  ‘Pardon	  Reference	  Group’	  (the	  PRG).	  The	   PRG	   had	   a	   limited	   lifespan,	   and	  was	   required	   to	   consider	   applications	   by	  persons	   ‘convicted	   and	   sentenced	   solely	   on	   account	   of	   allegedly	   having	  committed	  politically	  motivated	  offences	  before	  June	  16,	  1999’	  (Albutt,	  para.	  5).	  The	  Terms	  of	  Reference	  of	  the	  Special	  Dispensation	  also	  set	  out	  further	  details	  of	  how	   an	   applicant	   would	   qualify,	   including	   that	   they	   needed	   to	   have	   been	  sentenced	   to	   a	   period	   in	   prison	   or	   a	   fine	   for	   an	   offence,	   act	   or	   omission	  associated	  with	  a	  political	  objective	   committed	   in	   the	   course	  of	  offences	  of	   the	  past.	  While	  the	  PRG	  was	  charged	  with	  advising	  the	  President	  –	  he	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  he	  would	  form	  an	  independent	  opinion	  based	  on	  the	  material	  placed	  before	  him.	   Mbeki	   had	   also	   stated	   that	   in	   making	   the	   decision	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  pardon	   he	   would	   be	   guided	   by	   the	   principles	   and	   values	   that	   underpin	   the	  Constitution.	  These	  included	  ‘the	  principles	  and	  objectives	  of	  nation-­‐building	  and	  national	  reconciliation’.6	  The	  Presidential	  pardon	  was	  to	  be	  used	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  ‘unfinished	  business’	  of	   the	  TRC.7	  NGOs	  representing	  victims	  made	  attempts	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Address	  by	  the	  President	  of	  South	  Africa,	  Thabo	  Mbeki	  to	  the	  joint	  sitting	  of	  Parliament,	  Cape	  Town,	  21st	  November,	  2007	  -­‐	  http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4240	  (last	  accessed	  17th	  November,	  2011).	  7	  Id.	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facilitate	  and	  ensure	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  special	  dispensation	  process.	  The	  President	   and	   the	   PRG	   refused	   to	   provide	   victims	   or	   their	   representatives	   the	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  and	  thus	  litigation	  followed.	  	  	  Although	  multiple	  grounds	  were	  asserted	  for	  contending	  that	  victims	  had	  a	   right	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   process,	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   crystallized	   the	  question	  as	  being	  whether	  the	  ‘decision	  to	  exclude	  the	  victims	  from	  participating	  in	   the	   special	   dispensation	   process	   is	   irrational’	   (Albutt,	   para.	   47,	   emphasis	  added).	  The	  Court	  applied	  the	  principle	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  pardon	  power,	  in	  addition	   to	   being	   subject	   to	   the	   Constitution	   as	   the	   supreme	   law,	   and	   to	   the	  doctrine	  of	  legality,	  also	  ‘must	  be	  rationally	  related	  to	  the	  purpose	  sought	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  the	  exercise	  of	   it’	  (para.	  49).	  Thus,	  Chief	  Justice	  Ngcobo	  who	  wrote	  the	  main	   judgment	   surmised	   that	   the	   President’s	   approach	   to	   exclude	   victims	  from	   the	   process	   of	   the	   special	   dispensation	  must	   be	   rationally	   related	   to	   the	  achievement	  of	  the	  objective	  of	  granting	  the	  pardons.	  The	  means	  used	  had	  to	  be	  rationally	   related	   to	   the	   ends	   sought.	   This	   introduces	   an	   instrumental	   logic	  between	  mean-­‐ends	  in	  cognizing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  pardon	  power.	  Ngcobo	  CJ	  thus	  proceeded	   to	   asses	   the	   rationality	  of	   the	  dispensation	  process	   as	   a	  question	  of	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  means	  used	  to	  achieve	  the	  stated	  ends.	  	   The	   special	   dispensation	   had	   sought	   to	   attain	   national	   unity	   and	  reconciliation	  through	  the	  application	  of	  ‘principles	  and	  values	  that	  underpin	  the	  constitution’.	   These	   objectives	   (ends)	   and	   their	   formulation	   were	   principally	  drawn	  from	  President	  Mbeki’s	  speech	  of	  21st	  November,	  2007	  to	  the	  Joint-­‐Sitting	  of	   Parliament.	   Ngcobo	   CJ	   reasoned	   that	   as	   the	   special	   dispensation	   was	  compared	   by	   the	   President	   to	   the	   Amnesty	   process	   of	   the	   TRC,	   and	   the	  involvement	   of	   victims	   had	   been	   central	   to	   the	   work	   of	   the	   TRC,	   such	  participation	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  central	  to	  ‘rebuilding	  a	  nation	  torn	  apart	  by	  an	   evil	   system	   and	   promoting	   reconciliation’	   (para.	   56).	   If	   the	   latter	   were	   the	  
ends	  sought,	  to	  deny	  victim	  participation	  would	  constitute	  irrational	  means.	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  summed	  up	  the	  court’s	  approach	  thus:	  Once	   it	   is	  accepted,	  as	   it	  must	  be,	   that	   the	   twin	  objectives	  of	   the	  special	  dispensation	  process	  are	  nation-­‐building	  and	  national	  reconciliation	  and	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that	   the	   participation	   of	   victims	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	   achievement	   of	   these	  objectives,	   it	   can	   hardly	   be	   suggested	   that	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	   victims	  from	   the	   special	   dispensation	   process	   is	   rationally	   related	   to	   the	  achievement	  of	   the	  objectives	  of	   the	  special	  dispensation	  process.	   (para.	  68)	  He	  went	  on	  to	  say	  that	  victim	  participation	  in	  the	  process	  for	  granting	  pardons	  was	   ‘the	  only	   rational	  means	   to	   contribute	   towards	  national	   reconciliation	  and	  national	  unity’	  (69).	  It	  was	  also	  held	  that	  the	  context	  of	  the	  special	  dispensation	  process,	   involving	   the	   establishment	   of	   whether	   the	   relevant	   offence	   was	  committed	  with	  a	  political	  motive,	   required	   the	  victim	   to	  be	  granted	  a	  hearing	  (70).	   ‘Accountability,	   responsiveness,	   and	   openness’	   enshrined	   in	   s	   1(d)	   of	   the	  Constitution	  required	  that	  political	  parties	  alone	  could	  not	  be	  the	  ones	  permitted	  to	  make	   submissions	   to	   the	  PRG	  or	   the	  President.	   In	   a	   separate	   judgment	   that	  concurred	  with	   that	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice,	   Froneman	   J	   extended	   the	  basis	  of	   this	  conclusion	   to	   ‘African’	   notions	   of	   ‘participatory	   democracy’.	   	   But	   this	   latter	  tradition	  was	  only	  permitted	   the	  status	  of	  a	   ‘further	   legitimisation’	  of	   the	  main	  judgment,	   and	   was	   not	   treated	   as	   a	   ‘direct	   authority’	   (para.	   91).	   	   If	   African	  tradition	  was	  being	  invoked,	  it	  needed,	  it	  seems,	  to	  be	  given	  a	  subordinate	  status.	  	  	   The	  ends	  of	  nation-­‐building	  and	  reconciliation	  were	  not	  in	  question,	  but	  a	  process	  that	  excluded	  the	  participation	  of	  victims	  (the	  means	  used)	  was	  deemed	  irrational.	   The	   pardon	   process	   was	   thus	   subjected	   to	   the	   court’s	   standard	   of	  rationality,	   which,	   as	   with	   many	   courts	   around	   the	   world,	   is	   driven	   by	   the	  judicial	  approval	  of	  the	  means	  used	  to	  achieve	  legitimate	  or	  just	  ends.	  	  	   The	  judicial	  assessment	  of	  the	  means-­‐ends	  nexus	  is	  often	  presented	  as	  an	  objective	   test.	   The	   reasoning	   in	   such	   cases	   is	   often	   circular.	   Recall	   the	  preeminent	  English	  authority	  on	  rationality	  –	  the	  Wednesbury	  case.8	  In	  that	  case	  an	  unreasonable	   or	   irrational	   decision	  or	   judgment	  was	   characterized	  by	  Lord	  Greene	  MR	  as	  a	  decision	  	  ‘so	  unreasonable	  that	  no	  reasonable	  body	  could	  make	  such	   a	   decision’.	   A	   putative	   rational	   being	   is	   invoked	  who	   can	   stand	   in	   as	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Lord	  Greene	  in	  Associated	  Provincial	  Picture	  Houses	  v	  Wednesbury	  Corporation	  [1947]	  1	  KB	  223;	  see	  also	  Lord	  Diplock	  in	  Council	  of	  Civil	  Service	  Unions	  v	  Minister	  for	  the	  Civil	  Service	  [1985]	  AC	  374.	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objective	  standard	  to	  be	  compared	  with	  the	  impugned	  decision-­‐maker.	  A	  simpler	  way	  of	  putting	  it	  would	  be	  to	  say	  ‘it	  is	  such	  a	  bad	  decision	  that	  no	  good	  decision-­‐maker	  could	  have	  made	  it’,	  and	  the	  court	  will	  quash	  bad	  decisions.	  This	  circular	  reasoning	  is	  a	  powerful	  rhetorical	  gesture.	  It	  enacts	  an	   ‘as	  if’	  –	   ‘as	  if’	  courts	  can	  provide	   a	  measure	   for	   the	   full	   range	   of	   rational	   decisions.	   The	   nexus	   between	  ‘means’	  and	  ‘end’	  is	  that	  putative	  measure.	  Rationality	  in	  these	  cases	  is	  a	  notion	  formed	  through	  performative	  rhetorical	  gestures	  that	  place	  the	  substantive	  facts	  and	  circumstances	  of	  a	  case	  alongside	  the	  processes,	  strategies,	  and	  techniques	  of	  governance	  (means).	  The	  means	  used	  to	  reach	  particular	  objectives	  are	  then	  judged	  to	  be	  legitimate	  or	  not.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  exploring	  the	  relationship	  of	  means	  to	  ends	   further	   before	  moving	   to	   alternative	   characterizations	   of	   how	   the	   rule	   of	  law	  might	  interact	  with	  an	  exceptional	  juridical	  device	  such	  as	  the	  pardon	  power.	  	  	  
1.2	  	   The	  Means/Ends	  Logic	  and	  Rationality	  	  	   On	  what	  basis	  is	  a	  process	  (means	  used)	  regarded	  as	  legitimate?	  What	  is	  the	   relative	   relationship	   of	   means	   to	   ends?	   Can	   the	   ends	   be	   justified	   by	   the	  means,	  or	  vice-­‐versa?	  As	  Walter	  Benjamin	  put	  it	  in	  his	  seminal	  essay	  ‘A	  Critique	  of	  Violence’	  in	  1921:	  ‘the	  most	  elementary	  relationship	  in	  any	  legal	  system	  is	  that	  of	  ends	  to	  means,	  and	  further,	  that	  violence	  can	  first	  be	  sought	  only	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  means,	   not	   of	   ends’.9	   It	  might	   at	   first	   glance	   seem	   rather	   straightforward	   to	  assess	   whether	   violence	   (in	   the	   widest	   sense	   of	   the	   German	   term	   Gewalt)	   is	  being	   used	   for	   just	   or	   unjust	   ends.	   For	   instance,	   it	   might	   be	   assumed	   that	   a	  person	  convicted	  of	  a	   crime	  can	   legitimately	  be	   incarcerated	   for	  protecting	   the	  community	   or	   a	   range	   of	   other	   ends	   such	   as	   rehabilitation.	   The	   violence	   of	  confinement	   and	   deprivation	   of	   liberty	   would	   be	   justified	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   a	  judicial	   process	   established	   guilt	   and	   the	   proportionality	   of	   the	   sentence.	  Benjamin	  suggests	  that	  such	  a	  conclusion	  is	  not	  so	  self-­‐evident.	  We	  would	  still	  be	  troubled	  by	  whether	  violence	  could	  even	  be	  used	  for	  just	  ends.	  Nor	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  resolve	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  means.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  W.	  Benjamin,	  “Critique	  of	  Violence’	  in	  Benjamin,	  One-­Way	  Street	  and	  Other	  Writings	  (1978)	  132-­‐154.	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There	   are	   two	   standard	   resolutions	   offered	   for	   this	   means-­‐ends	  conundrum	  –	   from	  natural	   and	   positive	   law.	   Benjamin	   goes	   onto	   dismiss	   both	  schools:	  [They]	  meet	   in	   their	  common	  basic	  dogma:	   just	  ends	  can	  be	  attained	  by	  justified	  means,	  justified	  means	  used	  for	  just	  ends.	  Natural	  law	  attempts,	  by	   the	   justness	   of	   the	   ends,	   to	   ‘justify’	   the	   means,	   positive	   law	   to	  ‘guarantee’	  the	  justness	  of	  the	  ends	  through	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  means.	  This	   antinomy	   would	   prove	   insoluble	   if	   the	   common	   dogmatic	  assumption	  were	  false,	  if	  justified	  means	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  just	  ends	  on	  the	   other	   were	   in	   irreconcilable	   conflict.	   No	   insight	   into	   this	   problem	  could	  be	  gained,	  however,	  until	   the	   circular	  argument	  had	  been	  broken,	  and	  mutually	  independent	  criteria	  both	  of	  just	  ends	  and	  of	  justified	  means	  were	  established.10	  Benjamin	  interrupts	  and	  rejects	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  relationship	  of	  means	  to	  end	  can	  be	  taken	  for	  granted.	  There	  may	  well	  be	  just	  means	  and	  just	  ends.	  The	  problem	   lies	   in	   leaping	   from	   the	   justification	   of	   means	   to	   the	   justifications	   of	  ends	  and	  vice	  versa.	  We	  are	  thus	  called	  on	  to	  emphatically	  reject	  the	  natural	  law	  notion	  that	  means	  used	  can	  be	  legitimated	  by	  just	  ends.11	  	  	   Positive	  law	  admits	  of	  sanctioned	  and	  unsanctioned	  violence.	  The	  pardon	  power,	  existing	  as	  it	  does	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Constitution,	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  form	  of	  sanctioned	  violence	  deployed	  by	  the	  state.	  It	  is	  a	  form	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  an	  authorized	   force	   capable	  of	  bringing	  an	  end	   to	   the	  deprivation	  of	   liberty	  or	  other	   form	   of	   state-­‐sanctioned	   violence.	   The	   Constitutional	   Court	   in	   Albutt	  applies	   the	  positivist	  dogma	   that	   the	   legitimacy	  of	  ends	  can	  be	   ‘guaranteed’	  by	  just	  means.	   Such	   just	  means	   are	   equated	  with	   a	   process	   of	   consulting	   victims	  before	   the	   pardon	   power	   is	   exercised.	   The	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   exercise	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Ibid,	  133.	  11	  Walter	  Benjamin	  went	  onto	  to	  discuss	  violence	  as	  a	  means	  in	  terms	  of	   ‘law	  making’	  and	   ‘law	  preserving	  violence’,	  comparing	  revolutionary	  general	  strikes	  and	  the	  police	  power	  to	  determine	  when	  to	  intervene	  for	  ‘security	  reasons’	  (141-­‐42).	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  our	  inquiry	  to	  pursue	  Benjamin’s	  messianic	   account	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   non-­‐state	   form	   of	   ‘divine	   violence’	  which	  would	  break	  the	  reign	  of	  violence	  as	  means	  (153-­‐54).	  However,	  he	  does	  point	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  means	  and	  ends	  in	  a	  legal	  system,	  and	  interrupts	  the	  all	  too	  regular	  deployment	  of	  rational	  means	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  judging	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  ends.	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pardon	   power	   would	   then	   be	   guaranteed	   by	   the	   process	   of	   consultation.	   The	  Court,	  however,	  fails	  to	  countenance	  the	  fact	  that	  means	  and	  ends	  might	  exist	  in	  different	  orders	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  judgment.	  Moreover,	  they	  do	  not	  entertain	  the	  fact	  that	  means	  and	  ends	  might	  actually	  exist	  in	  irreconcilable	  conflict.	  This	  takes	  us	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  problem.	  The	  means-­‐end	  logic	  risks	  evading	  the	  question	  of	  responsibility	  and	  judgment.	  	  	  	   The	   pardon	   power	   vested	   by	   the	   Constitution	   in	   the	   President,	   and	   the	  circumscribed	   process	   he	   adopted	   for	   exercising	   it	   in	   this	   particular	   instance	  (through	   a	   process	   of	   consulting	   the	   PRG),	   was	   a	   means	   of	   attending	   to	   the	  ‘unfinished	   business’	   of	   transition	   from	   Apartheid	   and	   pursuing	   the	   ends	   of	  nation-­‐building	  and	  reconciliation.	  Neither	  the	  Court	  nor	  the	  President	  entertain	  the	  possibility	   that	   these	  means	   and	   ends	  may	  be	   irreconcilable,	   and	   justly	   so.	  The	   pardon	   power	   is	   invoked	   to	   contend	  with	   a	   crisis,	   to	   suture	   a	   tear	   in	   the	  polity.	  The	  victims	  can	   justly	  claim	  that	   they	  should	  be	   involved	   in	   the	  process	  that	   addresses	   the	   individual	   wounds,	   and	   especially	   the	   persons	   who	   have	  inflicted	  the	  scars.	  However,	  ‘finishing	  the	  business	  of	  reconciliation’	  through	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  pardon	  power	  hardly	  seems	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  infinite	  demands	  of	  responsibility	  that	  need	  to	  be	  attended	  to	  in	  South	  Africa.12	  	   We	   thus	   need	   to	   examine	  whether	   a	   law-­‐sanctioned	   power	   such	   as	   the	  pardon	   can	   be	   subjected	   to	   forms	   of	   judgment	   or	   responsibility.	   What	   is	   the	  nature	  of	  responsibility	  and	  judgment	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  power	  to	  pardon?	  	  The	  Court’s	   conclusion	   in	   Albutt	   was	   that	   nation-­‐building	   and	   reconciliation,	  reference	   to	   the	   TRC’s	   Amnesty	   process	   in	   the	   President’s	   2007	   speech,	   the	  deliberative	  nature	  of	  the	  South	  African	  democratic	  settlement,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  ascertain	   whether	   convictions	   were	   in	   fact	   for	   political	   crimes	   all	   point	   to	  consultation	  of	  victims	  as	  the	  only	  legitimate	  means.	  The	  validity	  of	  the	  judgment	  on	   whether	   to	   pardon	   depends	   on	   the	   process	   adopted	   when	   making	   the	  decision.	   It	   is	   a	   procedural	   approach	   to	   the	   question	   of	   judgment	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	   I	   return	   to	   this	  problem	  of	  a	  crisis	  of	   judgment	  and	  responsibility	  and	  an	  alternative	  critical	  approach	  below.	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responsibility.	  But	   is	  a	  procedural	  approach	  sufficient	   in	  the	   face	  of	  a	  power	  as	  irregular	   as	   the	   pardon?	  What	   does	   it	   mean	   to	   regularize	   the	   pardon	   power?	  More	  widely,	  what	   are	   the	   implications	   for	   transformative	   constitutionalism	   if	  the	   question	   of	   judgment	   and	   responsibility	   is	   reduced	   to	   procedure?	   Before	  addressing	  these	  questions	  I	  need	  to	  place	  the	  pardon	  power	  in	  a	  wider	  juridical	  and	  political	  frame	  than	  the	  one	  entertained	  by	  the	  Constitutional	  Court’s	  means-­‐end	  approach	  to	  a	  rational	  decision.	  	  	  
1.3	   Undoing	  the	  Pardon	  Power	  	  	   The	   state	   through	   the	   office	   of	   the	   President	   has	   the	   power	   to	   pardon.	  More	   widely	   the	   Albutt	   case	   poses	   the	   question	   of	   what	   the	   relationship	   is	  between	   the	   state	   and	   the	   law.	   The	   Constitution	   grants	   the	   power	   to	   the	  President.	   The	   source	   of	   the	   law	   is	   the	   Constitution.	   Nonetheless,	   there	   is	   a	  question	  of	  what	  governs	   the	   incidence	  of	   the	  exercise	  of	   the	  pardon	  power.	   Is	  the	  Presidential	  pardon	  power	  subject	   to	  other	  norms	  –	   such	  as	   the	  version	  of	  reasonableness	   and	   rationality	   administered	   by	   the	   Constitutional	   Court?	   Or	  does	  the	  Presidential	  pardon	  power	  express	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  ‘sacral’	  or	  ‘infinite’	  element	   in	   the	   juridical	   order?	   The	   former	   more	   delimited	   approach	   to	   the	  pardon	  power	  was	   expressed	   in	   the	  1997	   ruling	  of	   the	  Constitutional	   Court	   in	  
The	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa	  v	  Hugo.	  The	  Court	  said:	  "(Pardoning	  a	  sentenced	  person)	  is	  not	  a	  private	  act	  of	  grace	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  pardoning	  power	  in	  a	  monarchy	  may	  be.	  It	  is	  recognition	  in	  the	  Interim	  Constitution	  that	  a	  power	  should	  be	  granted	  to	  the	  President	  to	  determine	  when,	  in	  his	  view,	  the	  public	  welfare	  will	  be	  better	  served	  by	  granting	  a	  remission	  of	  sentence	  or	  some	  other	  form	  of	  pardon."	  This	   is	   an	   instrumental	   rationalization	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   pardon	   power,	  and	   a	   utilitarian	   account	   of	   when	   it	   should	   be	   exercised.	   Beyond	   this	   narrow	  ambit	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  pardon	  power	  should	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  ordinary	  law	  of	  the	  land	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  extended	  scholarly	  discussion.	  	  	   According	   to	   Paul	   Kahn	   who	   renews	   the	   significance	   of	   Carl	   Schmitt’s	  thinking	  for	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  disputes	  in	  contemporary	  settings	  –	  we	  need	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to	  take	  seriously	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  state	  admits	  of	  an	  existential	  and	  sacral	  element	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  any	  juridical	  order.13	  Famously	  for	  Schmitt,	  ‘Sovereign	   is	   he	   who	   decides	   the	   exception’.14	   Moreover,	   the	   exception	   is	   not	  lawless	   chaos	  but	   a	  borderline	   situation	   that	   is	   part	   of	   the	   juridical	   order.	  The	  medieval	  monarch	  manifested	   the	  miraculous	   and	   sacral	   aspect	   of	   sovereignty	  through	  the	  notion	  of	   the	   ‘King’s	   two	  bodies’.15	  The	  King	  was	  at	  once	  a	  natural	  and	  finite	  person,	  and	  infinite	  in	  the	  reach	  of	  his	  office	  –	   ‘the	  King	  is	  dead,	   long	  live	   the	   King’.	   The	   monarch	   could	   also	   defy	   the	   laws	   of	   nature	   by	   curing	  individuals	  through	  the	  laying	  of	  hands,	  and	  step	  outside	  the	  law	  of	  the	  land	  to	  address	   the	   social	   body	   through	   equity.16	   	   The	   pardon	   power	   is	   one	   sense	   in	  which	  the	  sacral	  power	  of	  the	  mediaeval	  monarch	  persists.	  As	  Kahn	  puts	  it:	  This	  is	  a	  remnant	  of	  the	  sovereign	  power	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  exception	  to	  the	  law.	  It	  always	  verges	  on	  lawlessness	  as	  we	  try	  to	  find	  a	  ground	  for	  mercy	  that	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  mere	  partiality.	  The	  ground	  can	  only	  be	  care,	  which	  is	  always	  personal	  and	  unbound	  by	  rules.	  We	  may	  feel	  that	  we	  need	  a	  pardon	  power;	  yet	  if	  we	  cannot	  speak	  of	  care,	  love,	  or	  the	  sacred,	  we	  are	  at	   a	   loss	   to	   offer	   a	   justification	   that	   is	   consistent	  with	   our	   other	   beliefs	  about	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  Our	  ordinary	  inclination,	  then,	  is	  to	  displace	  pardon	  by	  a	  system	  of	  ‘earned	  probation’,	  administered	  by	  a	  bureaucratic	  board.	  We	  seek	  to	  normalize	  the	  exception.17	  Kahn	  identifies	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  rule	  of	   law,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  an	  exceptional	  power	  that	  is	  not	  regulated	  by	  the	  normal	  law.	  As	  Grant	  Gilmore	  put	  it:	   ‘In	  Hell,	   there	  will	  be	  nothing	  but	   law’.18	  The	  pardon	   is	  an	  event,	   a	  decision,	  which	  quintessentially	   should	  be	  outside	   law:	   ‘it	   is	   a	   gift	   that	   comes	  as	   if	   from	  nowhere.	   Indeed	   if	  we	  can	  give	  an	  account	  of	   its	  exercise	   in	  a	  particular	  case	  –	  that	  is,	  if	  we	  can	  offer	  a	  causal	  explanation	  of	  how	  the	  pardon	  came	  to	  be	  granted	  –	  we	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  judge	  it	  corrupt’.19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Kahn,	  (2011),	  p.	  37ff.	  14	  C	  Schmitt,	  Political	  Theology:	  Four	  Chapters	  on	  Sovereignty	  ([1922]	  1986).	  15	  See	  E	  Kantorowicz,	  The	  Kings	  Two	  Bodies:	  A	  Study	  in	  Mediaeval	  Political	  Theology	  (1957);	  and	  E	  Santner,	  The	  Royal	  Remains:	  The	  People’s	  Two	  Bodies	  and	  the	  Endgames	  of	  Sovereignty	  (2011).	  16	  Kahn,	  (2011),	  p.	  37.	  17	  Ibid,	  38.	  18	  Ibid.	  19	  Ibid.	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   Importantly,	  Kahn	  also	  points	  to	  the	  reluctance	  in	  a	  liberal	  legal	  order	  to	  invoke	  notions	  of	   ‘care,	   love,	   or	   the	   sacred’	  when	   justifying	  or	   legitimating	   the	  exercise	  of	  exceptional	  powers.	  The	  tendency	  is	  to	  seek	  a	  bureaucratic	  resolution	  –	   or	   as	   we	   see	   in	  Albutt,	   a	  means-­‐end	   rationalization,	   as	   well	   as	   instrumental	  reasons	  such	  as	  public	  welfare	  as	  in	  The	  President	  v	  Hugo.	  Reliance	  is	  placed	  on	  a	  form	   of	   technical	   expertise	   (probation),	   or	   mode	   of	   reasoning	   (means-­‐end)	  where	   judgment	  and	  responsibility	  are	   replaced	  with	  a	   logic	  of	   substitution.	   In	  the	   face	   of	   what	   remains	   of	   a	   fearsome	   power	   (the	   sovereign	   exception)	  utilitarian	   reasons	   (of	   social	   cohesion	   or	   welfare)	   and	   procedural	   forms	   are	  asserted.	  As	  I	  have	  kept	  emphasizing,	  this	  evades	  the	  problem	  of	   judgment	  and	  responsibility.	  	  	   In	   this	   context	   it	   is	  worth	   recalling	   the	  hopes	  and	  aspirations	   that	  were	  laid	  out	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  adjudication	  in	  the	  ‘new	  South	  Africa’.	  With	  constitutional	  supremacy	  came	  a	  call	  for	  judges	  to	  take	  an	  active	  part	  in	  the	  transformative	   aspirations	   of	   the	   Constitution.	   The	   rule	   of	   law	   needed	   to	   be	  given	  teeth	  and	  content	  –	  but	  with	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	  what	  the	  South	  African	  post-­‐apartheid	   setting	   demanded.	   It	   is	   worth	   quoting	   at	   length,	   then,	   Karl	   Klare’s	  articulation	   of	   the	   ‘postliberal’	   approach	   to	   constitutional	   adjudication	   and	   the	  rule	  of	  law:	  ¨Do	  traditional	  accounts	  of	  legal	  constraint	  and	  the	  rule-­‐of-­‐law	  ideal	  make	  sense	   in	   the	   new	   South	   Africa?	   Does	   the	   rule-­‐of-­‐law	   ideal	   imply	   a	  depoliticized	   conception	   of	   law	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   aspiration	   to	  develop	   adjudicative	   methods	   that	   will	   contribute	   to	   egalitarian	   social	  change?	   Or,	   must	   we	   develop	   a	   revised,	   perhaps	   somewhat	   more	  politicized,	  understanding	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  adjudication	  that	  can	  be	  consistent	   with	   and	   support	   transformative	   hopes?	   Can	   we	   conceive	  practices	  of	  constitutional	   interpretation	  that	  acknowledge	  and	   fulfil	   the	  duty	  of	  interpretive	  fidelity	  and	  yet	  that	  are	  engaged	  with	  and	  committed	  to	  'establish[ing]	  a	  society	  based	  on	  democratic	  values,	  social	  justice	  and	  fundamental	   human	   rights,'	   a	   society	   that	  will	   '[i]mprove	   the	   quality	   of	  life	  of	  all	  citizens	  and	  free	  the	  potential	  of	  each	  person[,]'	  in	  the	  words	  of	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the	  Preamble?	  Can	  we	  describe	  a	  method	  of	  adjudication	  that	  is	  politically	  and	  morally	  engaged	  but	  that	  is	  not	   illicit	   'judicial	   legislation'?	  Is	  there	  a	  
postliberal	  account	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  suitable	  to	  the	  political	  challenges	  South	  Africa	  has	  set	  for	  itself?20	  Klare	  was	  articulating	  the	  need	  to	  break	  from	  traditional	  models	  of	  adjudication,	  and	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   during	   apartheid	   was	   a	   system-­‐preserving	  institution	  with	  habits	  of	  adjudication	  and	  legal	  practice	  from	  which	  a	  deliberate	  and	   conscious	   break	   was	   required.	   It	   was	   not	   sufficient	   for	   South	   Africa	   to	  develop	   a	   sophisticated	   constitutional	   framework	   with	   transformative	  aspirations.	  	  None	  of	  this	  would	  be	  of	  much	  consequence	  if	  judges	  saw	  their	  role	  in	   conventional	   liberal	   terms	  as	   those	  who	  merely	  applied	  and	   interpreted	   the	  law	  ‘on	  the	  books’	  (as	  if	  that	  were	  ever	  possible!).	  What,	  then,	  does	  it	  means	  for	  judges	   to	   be	  politically	   and	  morally	   engaged	   in	   a	   transformative	   constitutional	  enterprise?	  	  	   I	  cannot	  say	  whether	  Klare	  would	  approve	  of	  the	  Court’s	  approach	  to	  the	  Presidential	   pardon	   in	  Albutt.	   That	   is	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   notion	   of	  ‘postliberal’	  which	  connotes	  both	  the	  preservation	  of	  liberal	  rights	  and	  values,	  as	  well	   as	   expecting	   a	   departure	   from	   them.	   It	  may	   be	   that	   the	   Court’s	   stance	   of	  requiring	   that	   victims	   be	   accorded	   a	   hearing	   conforms	   to	   the	   constitutional	  aspiration	   –	   visible	   also	   in	   the	   constraints	   on	   emergency	   powers	   (s.	   37)	   –	   of	  holding	  the	  executive	  to	  account	  in	  a	  setting	  where	  executive	  power	  has	  been	  the	  instrument	  of	  multiple	  excesses.	  What	  emerges,	  then,	  is	  the	  sense	  that	  according	  victims	  a	  hearing	  cannot	  be	  the	  end	  of	  the	  matter	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  determining	  the	   role	   and	   content	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   in	   a	   post-­‐colonial	   or	   transformative	  setting.	  We	  are	  simply	  left	  with	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  been	  effective	  in	   reviewing	   the	  exercise	  of	   the	  pardon	  power	  because	   the	  President	  has	  been	  held	   to	   the	   Court’s	   standard	   of	   rationality.	   I	   would	   like	   to	   pose	   the	   problem	  rather	  differently.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  K	  Klare,	  “Legal	  Culture	  and	  Transformative	  Constitutionalism”	  [1998]	  South	  African	  Journal	  of	  
Human	  Rights,	  p150.	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A	   general	   tension	   thus	   emerges	   between	   what	   can	   be	   described	   as	  neoliberal	   forms	   of	   governance,	   and	   the	   necessary	   recourse	   to	   the	   exceptional	  and	   the	   infinite	   in	   any	   juridical	   order.	   In	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Neoliberalism	  David	  Harvey	   points	   to	   the	   juridicalisation	   of	   politics	   as	   a	   key	   feature	   of	  neoliberalism.21	   He	   suggests	   that	   neoliberal	   governance	   takes	   place	   through	  experts	  and	  elites	  who	  are	  often	  suspicious	  of	  and	  discourage	  more	  democratic	  and	   parliamentary	   modes	   of	   decision-­‐making.	   With	   the	   horizons	   of	   social	  agonism	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  consensus	  limited	  or	  discredited,	  political	  conflict	  is	  shifted	  to	  the	  courts.	  The	  rule	  of	  law’s	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights	  becomes	  the	  key	  mediator	  and	  remedy	  to	  wider	  political	  and	  social	  disagreements.	   	  This	  rights-­‐centred	   governance	   is	   also	   accompanied	   by	   a	   potentially	   contradictory	  appeal	   to	   populism	   in	   times	   of	   crisis.	   Immigration,	   crime,	   migrant	   labour,	  refugees,	   and	   the	   post	   9/11	   security	   agenda	   are	   all	   dealt	   with	   as	   if	   there	   is	   a	  ‘society’	   and	   cohesive	   nation-­‐state	   being	   harmed	   by	   an	   external	   threat.	  Neoliberal	  institutions	  take	  the	  individual	  as	  primary	  and	  elevate	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  as	  the	  key	  protector	  and	  guardian	  of	  individual	  interests.	  Experts	  such	  as	  judges	  are	  increasingly	  deployed	  to	  check	  political	  decisions	  and	  to	  assess	  whether	  they	  conform	  to	  increasingly	  globalised	  standards	  of	  governance.	  	  
2	   Plural	  Becoming	  	  
2.1	   The	  Sovereign	  Return	  	   What	  was	  hidden	  in	  this	  constitutional	  conflict	  over	  the	  pardon	  was	  a	  fear	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  President.	  It	  is	  a	  fear	  of	  an	  archaic	  sovereign	  remainder	  to	  be	  found	   in	   all	   modern	   democratic	   states,	   even	   though	   the	   framers	   of	   the	   South	  African	  Constitution	  have	  done	  much	  to	  delimit	  it.	  Plurality	  may	  hold	  the	  key	  to	  addressing	  this	  fear,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  developing	  a	  different	  conception	  of	  judgment	  and	   responsibility	   through	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   	  We	   can	   only	   begin	   to	   explore	   that	  here.	   Addressing	   the	   archaic	   sovereign	   remainder	   which	   presented	   itself	   in	  
Albutt	  is	  one	  place	  to	  start.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  D	  Harvey,	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Neoliberalism	  (2005)	  66-­‐7.	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  In	   the	  opening	  pages	  of	  Rogues:	  Two	  Essays	   on	  Reason,	   Jacques	  Derrida	  refers	  to	  ‘The	  Wolf	  and	  the	  Lamb’,	  a	  poem	  by	  La	  Fontaine.22	  This	  poem	  expresses	  the	  question	  ‘who	  has	  the	  ability,	  right	  or	  power	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  law’,	  and	  with	  what	  force.	  	  Derrida	  restates	  it	  as	  follows:	  “But	  just	  who	  has	  the	  right	  to	  give	  or	  take	  some	  right,	  to	  give	  him-­‐	  or	  herself	  some	  right	  or	  the	  law,	  to	  attribute	  or	  to	  make	   the	   law	   in	   a	   sovereign	   fashion?	   Or	   to	   suspend	   the	   law	   in	   a	   sovereign	  way?”23	   In	   the	  South	  African	  setting	   this	   is	  presented	  as	  a	   tension	  between	   the	  assertion	  of	  the	  President	  to	  govern	  with	  a	  popular	  mandate,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  courts	  in	  constitutional	  adjudication.	  Carl	  Schmitt	  has	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  responses	   to	   this	  question	   in	   the	  modern	  tradition.	   	  He	  gives	  an	  account	  of	   the	  laicised	   theology	   of	   sovereign	   power,	   drawn	   from	   the	   ‘outer	   most	   sphere’	   of	  limit-­‐situations	  as	  he	  called	  it.	  The	  pardon	  is	  one	  such	  limit	  situation	  –	  one	  that	  the	  Court	  in	  South	  Africa	  attempted	  to	  discipline	  through	  the	  means-­‐end	  account	  of	  rationality.	   It	  also	  drew	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  principles	   in	  the	   Constitution	   is	   participatory	   democracy	   –	   and	   that	   principle	   avows	  consultation	  and	  the	  opportunity	  to	  present	  a	  view.	  The	  real	  fear,	  however,	  is	  the	  President’s	  ability	  to	  say	  ‘I	  can’,	  and	  ‘I	  will’.	  This	  is	  the	  ipseity	  of	  sovereignty	  that	  grounds	   and	   threatens	   the	   constitutional	   order.	   It	   is	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   when	  President	  Jacob	  Zuma	  asserts	  that:	  “[t]he	  powers	  conferred	  on	  the	  Courts	  cannot	  be	   regarded	   as	   superior	   to	   the	   powers	   resulting	   from	   a	  mandate	   given	   by	   the	  people	  in	  a	  popular	  vote”.24	  	  
Ipseity	   is	  akin	  to	  auto	   in	  Greek.	   	   It	   is	   from	  this	   ipse	   that	  one	  extracts	   the	  possibility	  of	  giving	  oneself	  law,	  or	  asserting	  self-­‐determination.	  Democracy	  can	  only	   be	   imagined	   with	   the	   assertion	   of	   this	   ipse/auto	   –	   the	   autonomous,	   self-­‐same	  subject.	  This	  ipseity	  is	  taken	  up	  in	  liberal	  ontology,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  is	  called	  into	   question	   by	   Derrida.	   This	   possibility	   of	   an	   ‘I	   can’	   by	   myself,	   that	   is,	   this	  
ipseity,	   is	   named	   in	   order	   to	   call	   it	   into	   question.	   This	   involves	   calling	   into	  question	   the	   ‘assembling’	   of	   the	   ‘resembling	   ensemble’,	   the	   simulacra	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  J	  Derrida,	  Rogues:	  Two	  Essays	  on	  Reason.	  (2005)	  23	  As	  above,	  (xi).	  24	  Address	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  bidding	  farewell	  to	  Chief	  Justice	  Ngcobo	  and	  welcoming	  Chief	  Justice	  Mogoeng,	  1st	  November,	  2011,	  cited	  in	  Geoff	  Budlender,	  ‘People’s	  Power	  and	  the	  Courts”,	  the	  Bram	  Fischer	  Lecture,	  2011,	  unpublished.	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resemblance,	   the	   simulation	   that	   is	   the	   act	   of	  making	   similar.25	   	   This	   is	   at	   the	  heart	  of	  what	   is	  potent	   about	   the	  presidential	   assertion	  –	   ‘I	   can,	   ‘I	  will’,	   ‘in	   the	  name	  of	  the	  people,	  their	  democratic	  mandate’	  and	  so	  on.	  To	  say	  ‘I	  can’	  also	  has	  a	  social	  manifestation	  and	  is	  a	  key	  condition	  of	  many	  liberal	  and	  modern	  concepts	  (albeit	   with	   a	   pedigree	   that	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   antiquity):	   possession,	  property,	   power,	   husband,	   father,	   son,	   proprietor,	   seignior,	   sovereign,	   host,	   or	  master.	  	  Think,	  also,	  of	  the	  possessive	  individual	  from	  Hobbes	  and	  Locke.	  	  There	  can	  be	  no	   liberalism,	   and	  no	   liberal	  democracy,	  not	   to	  mention	  all	   those	   social	  contract	  theories,	  without	  this	  notion	  of	  ipseity.26	  	   The	  exercise	  of	  presidential	  power	  and	  the	  assertion	  of	  its	  independence	  from	  other	  constitutional	  branches	  is	  the	  eruption	  of	  what	  threatens	  democracy	  from	  within.	   In	  modern	   democracy	   the	   individual	   autonomous	   being	   becomes	  one	   with	   a	   people	   or	   nation,	   authorises	   subjection	   to	   a	   sovereign,	   or	   holds	  sovereignty	   as	   one-­‐of-­‐the-­‐many	   citizens.	   	   Democracy	   is	   a	   force,	   a	   force	   in	   the	  form	  of	  a	  sovereign	  authority	  (as	  reason	  and	  decisiveness),	  and	  re-­‐presentation	  of	  the	  power	  and	  ipseity	  of	  a	  people.	  The	  authorisation	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  power	  in	  modern	  democracy	  must	  constantly	  return	  to	  its	  source,	  its	  authorisation.	  	  While	  the	   axiomatic	   of	   democracy	   as	   circle,	   sphere,	   ipseity,	   autos	   of	   autonomy,	  symmetry,	  homogeneity,	  semblance	  and	  similarity,	  and	  God	  which	  is	  the	  analogy	  in	   the	   American	   Declaration,	   are	   all	   ways	   of	   expressing	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	  political,	  Derrida	   identifies	   the	  double	  bind	  within	   this	   tradition	  of	   democracy.	  Each	  of	   these	  elements	  are	   incompatible	  with,	   and	  clash	  with,	   the	   ‘truth	  of	   the	  democratic’,	   namely	   the	   other,	   heterogeneity,	   dissymmetry,	   multiplicity,	   the	  anonymous	  ‘anyone’,	  the	  ‘each	  one’.27	  	  	  Although	  participatory	  democracy	  is	  an	  important	  principle	  in	  the	  South	  African	  Constitution	  it	  hardly	  begins	  to	  tackle	  what	  might	  be	  rotten	  in	  the	  core	  of	  democracy.	   Democracy	   is	   an	   ipso-­‐centric	   order	   where	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	  political	  undoes	  itself	  when	  it	  is	  given	  expression	  through	  a	  sovereign	  form.	  	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Derrida	  (in	  *	  above),	  11.	  26	  As	  above,	  11-­‐12.	  27	  As	  above	  14.	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double	  bind	  of	  ipseity	  is	  the	  clash	  of	  the	  ‘I	  can’	  with	  the	  autonomy	  of	  ‘everyone’.	  This	   is	  what	  Derrida	   termed	   the	   auto-­‐immunity	   of	   democracy	   -­‐	   the	   possibility	  that	   like	   a	   body’s	   immune	   system	   which	   can	   turn	   on	   itself,	   the	   principle	   of	  autonomy	  and	  a	   representative	  mandate	   can	  destroy	   the	  very	   conditions	  of	   its	  own	  existence.	  	  	  	  	  	   How	  should	  a	  post-­‐liberal	  legal	  system	  respond	  to	  this	  sovereign	  return?	  In	   constituting	   a	   legal	   order,	   sovereignty	   is	   in	   movement	   towards	   a	   frame	   of	  reference,	   a	  normalised	  political	   condition.	  The	   illimitable	   thus	  moves	   towards	  and	   by	   way	   of	   a	   limit.	   	   It	   could	   also	   be	   said	   that	   the	   illimitable	   exists	   in	   and	  through	   a	   limit.	   	   As	   Derrida	   puts	   it,	   once	   the	   indivisible	   is	   divided,	   and	   the	  illimitable	   has	   been	   limited,	   sovereignty	   as	   the	   ‘undivided’	   and	   ‘unshared’	  becomes	  an	  impossible	  possibility.	  	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  singular	  plenitude	  of	  sovereignty	  which	  is	  often	  asserted:	  is	  it	  not	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  sovereignty	  everywhere	  and	  in	   every	   case,	   precisely	   its	   exceptional	   indivisibility,	   its	   illimitation,	   its	  integral	   integrity?	   	   Sovereignty	   is	  undivided,	  unshared,	  or	   it	   is	  not.	   	  The	  division	  of	   the	   indivisible,	   the	   sharing	  of	  what	   cannot	  be	   shared:	   that	   is	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  impossible.28	  What	  is	  crucial	  here	  is	  the	  insight	  that	  whatever	  divides	  -­‐	  and	  the	  sovereign	  limit	  divides	   -­‐	   also	   “shares	   itself”	   in	   this	   partition.29	   	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   assertion	  of	  something	  like	  the	  plenitude	  of	  the	  pardon	  power	  exposes	  the	  frontier	  and	  fault	  line	  of	  sovereignty.	  That	  is	  precisely	  why	  cases	  such	  as	  Albutt	  are	  limit	  cases	  in	  more	   than	  one	   sense.	  They	  expose	   the	   return	  of	   the	  archaic	   sovereign	   form	  as	  well	   as	   test	   the	  efficacy	  of	   limiting	   the	   illimitable,	  dividing	   the	   indivisible.	   	  The	  question,	  now,	  is	  whether	  that	  ‘impossible	  possibility’	  as	  Derrida	  called	  the	  task	  of	  undoing	  sovereign	  plenitude	  can	  be	  driven	  deeper	  into	  the	  re-­‐imagination	  of	  the	  democratic	  polity	  than	  the	  instrumental	  logic	  of	  means-­‐end	  rationality	  which	  the	  court	  deployed	  and	  we	  examined	  above.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  J	  Derrida,	  Without	  Alibi	  (2003)	  xx.	  29	  As	  above.	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2.2	   Rule	  of	  Law:	  Rationality	  or	  Plurality?	  
	   Tackling	   the	  persistent	   sovereign	  return	  can	  be	  undertaken	   through	   the	  court	  examining	   the	  rationality	  of	   the	  decision.	  We	  have	  observed	   the	   limits	   to	  this	  approach,	  and	  will	  further	  explore	  the	  limits	  of	  it	  below.	  If	  plurality	  is	  to	  be	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  democratic	  and	  participatory	  polity	  as	  an	  alternative	  approach,	  what	  will	   anchor	   it	   in	   the	   juridical	   order?	   In	   this	   section	   I	   explore	   the	   deeper	  limits	  to	  the	  rationalist	  approach	  as	  well	  as	  point	  towards	  how	  plurality	  might	  be	  installed	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	  rule	  of	   law	  guaranteed	  by	   the	  constitutional	  order.	  Through	  the	  notion	  of	  plurality	  I	  wish	  to	  deepen	  the	  constitutional	  grounds	  for	  delimiting	   sovereign	   power.	   The	   epistemic	   resources	   for	   this	   move	   might	   be	  drawn	  from	  tradition,	  custom,	  ubuntu,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  critical	  approach	  to	  judgment	  and	  responsibility.	  	  
Albutt	   fails	   to	   reflect	   the	   ontological	   plurality	   (of	   law	   and	   political	  existence)	  when	  giving	  content	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  the	  South	  African	  setting.	  The	  exercise	   of	   the	   pardon	   power	  was	   certainly	   linked	   to	   the	   need	   to	   build	   a	   new	  polity	   and	   achieve	   reconciliation.	   This	   approach,	   reflected	   in	   the	   amnesty	  process	  of	  the	  TRC,	  was	  the	  relatively	  unique	  compromise	  that	  was	  struck	  in	  the	  negotiations	  that	  lay	  the	  ground	  for	  a	  post-­‐apartheid	  order.	  But	  the	  TRC	  process	  need	   not	   have	   been	   the	   only	   way	   to	   attend	   to	   the	   ‘unfinished	   business’	   of	  reconciliation.	  Indeed,	  a	  new	  and	  different	  process	  may	  have	  been	  more	  apt	  for	  dealing	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  incarcerated	  persons	  languishing	  in	  prisons	  while	  the	  state	  and	  NGOs	  debated	  the	   ‘rationality’	  of	  the	  process.	  The	   ‘law	  of	  the	  law’	  may	  well	  have	  suggested,	  and	  indeed	  required,	  that	  a	  swift	  and	  effective	  process	  was	  the	  most	  apt	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  people	  who	  had	  applied	  for	  a	  pardon	  for	  political	  crimes.	  Albutt	  reflects	  a	  Court	  exercising	  a	  notion	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  too	  caught	   up	   with	   a	   Kantian	   notion	   of	   rationality,	   rather	   than	   one	   reflecting	   the	  ontological	   plurality	   reflected	   in	   ubuntu	   or	   other	  ways	   of	   expressing	   the	   same	  values.	   	  However,	   ubuntu	  or	   an	  ontology	  of	  plurality	   as	   an	   approach	   to	  what	   I	  have	   termed	   the	   ‘sovereign	   return’	   does	   not	   necessarily	   lead	   to	   a	   different	  outcome	  in	  the	  case.	  	  The	  approach	  of	  plurality	  may	  well	  deem	  consultation	  and	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the	   opportunity	   to	   be	   heard	   as	   central	   to	  what	   the	   rule	   of	   law	  might	   require.	  Though	   the	   outcome	   might	   be	   similar	   or	   the	   same,	   how	   one	   get’s	   there	   is	  significant.	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  delve	  deeper	  into	  this	  argument.	  	  	   Linda	  Meyer’s	  Justice	  as	  Mercy	  contrasts	  the	  Kantian	  approach	  with	  more	  pluralist	   approaches	   to	   pardon,	   mercy,	   and	   forgiveness.30	   She	   begins	   by	  contrasting	   the	   retributive	  objection	   to	   reconciliatory	   theories	   of	   justice	  which	  involve	  mercy,	  pardon,	  and	  grace.	  The	  standard	  view	   from	  those	  who	  promote	  retribution	  as	  a	  basis	   for	  punishment	   is	   that	  anything	  else	   is	  demeaning	  of	   the	  accused,	  and	   is	   inegalitarian.	   Justice	  Clarence	  Thomas	  of	   the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  epitomizes	   this	   latter	  view,	   and	  he	  has	  put	   it	   like	   this:	   ‘A	   system	   that	  does	  not	  hold	   individuals	  accountable	   for	  their	  harmful	  acts	  treats	  them	  as	   less	  than	  full	  citizens.	   In	   such	  a	  world,	   people	   are	   reduced	   to	   the	   status	  of	   children	  or,	   even	  worse,	   treated	   as	   though	   they	   are	   animals	   without	   a	   soul’	   (2).	   A	   utilitarian	  response	   to	   this	   retributivist	   stance	   is	   to	   claim	   that	   just	   desert	   can	   be	  manipulated	   to	   produce	   the	   best	   outcome	   for	   the	   greatest	   number	   by	   treating	  crime	   harshly	   or	   leniently	   –	   whichever	   produces	   the	   best	   outcome	   for	   the	  greatest	  number.	  However,	  there	  is	  then	  Justice	  Thomas’s	  Kantian	  objection	  that	  people	   are	   being	   treated	   as	   objects	   and	   not	   as	   full	   moral	   agents	   capable	   of	  making	   choices	  with	   consequences.	   Responding	   to	   these	   arguments	   requires	   a	  move	   away	   from	   the	  Kantian	   grounds	  of	   responsibility,	   ethics,	   and	   community	  (3).	  	   	  Meyer	   argues	   that	   reason	   cannot	   be	   such	   a	   ground	   as	   ‘reason	   itself	  requires	  a	  prior	  stance	  of	  being	  with	  others’.	  This	  political	  condition	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐common	  (Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy)	  is	  akin	  to	  the	  ‘law	  of	  the	  law’	  to	  which	  I	  have	  alluded	  to	  above.	  With	  this	  move	  towards	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘being	  with’	  as	  ontologically	  prior	  to	  rationalist	  orders	  of	  law	  and	  justice	  (or	  means-­‐end	  logics),	  Meyer	  argues	  that	  mercy	   is	   not	   the	   exception	   to	   law	   (as	   Paul	   Kahn	   has	   put	   it)	   or	   a	   practical	  compromise	  (as	  utilitarians	  would	  have	  it),	  but	  in	  fact	  the	  ground	  of	  justice:	  ‘the	  basis	  on	  which	  justice	  itself	  is	  possible’.	  A	  simplified	  Kantian	  position,	  she	  argues,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Linda	  Meyer,	  Justice	  as	  Mercy	  (2010).	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has	   become	   a	   legal	   ‘catechism’	   or	   ‘Kanticism’.	   If	   we	   understand	   ‘reason’	   as	   a	  system	   of	   logically	   consistent	   rules,	   then	   a	   community	   or	   law	   that	   operates	  according	   to	   reason,	   or	   in	   a	   reasonable	   manner,	   might	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	  community	   that	   is	   held	   together	   by	   reason	   (9).	   This	   Kantian	   position	   is	   a	  conception	  of	  ‘justice	  as	  reason’,	  and	  of	  community	  as	  held	  together	  by	  reason:	  	  ‘The	  ideal	  of	  justice	  as	  a	  system	  of	  rules	  is	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  our	  legal	  system.	   Reason	   is	   the	   touchstone	   for	   law.	   Irrational	   laws	   are	  unconstitutional;	   irrational	   people	   are	   not	   criminally	   responsible.	  Differences	   in	   treatment	   must	   be	   either	   explained	   as	   reasonable	   or	  eliminated.	   ‘Interest’,	   ‘feeling’,	  or	   ‘opinion’	   is	  not	  universal	  and	  therefore	  not	  a	  reason;	  selfish	  prudence	  is	  not	  a	  reason’	  (9)	  Meyer	  draws	  on	  the	  later	  Kant	  of	  the	  Critique	  of	  Judgment,	  as	  well	  as	  Heidegger	  and	   Levinas,	   to	   give	   an	   account	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   justice	   and	   grace	  (surprisingly	   failing	   to	  mention	   Jean-­‐Luc	   Nancy’s	   intensification	   of	   this	   line	   of	  argument).	  The	  problem	  with	  Kanticism	  is	   that	   it	  makes	  us	  believe	   that	  reason	  arises	  before	  our	  connection	  to	  each	  other.	  But	  reason	  is	  not	  the	  ‘glue’	  that	  links	  one	  person	  to	  another.	  Meyer	  argues	  that	  mercy	  does	  not	  follow	  rules	  of	  reason	  and	  cannot	  be	  universalized.	  Once	  the	  switch	  to	  Heidegger	  and	  Levinas	  is	  made	  –	  it	   is	   ethical	   community	   that	   is	   the	   given,	   and	   reason	   that	   is	   a	   derivative.	   Our	  being-­‐with	  is	  not	  derived	  from	  reason,	  it	  is	  ontologically	  prior.	  Community	  is	  not	  derived	  from	  being	  reasonable,	  it	  is	  already	  given	  (4).	  	   ‘Justice	  as	  reason’,	  and	  reason	  as	  the	  ‘glue’	  that	  holds	  community	  together	  is	  the	  view	  that	  Meyer	  challenges.	  As	  she	  explains,	  the	  Kanticism	  of	  law	  is	  based	  on	  Kant’s	  Groundwork	  on	   the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  which	   set	  out	  propositions	  that	   have	   become	   deeply	   embedded	   in	   legal	   systems.	   Kant’s	   motivation	   for	  making	  reason	  the	  foundation	  of	  ethics	  and	  community	  was	  driven	  by	  an	  urge	  to	  free	  human	  will	   from	  causal	  necessity	   (11).	   Principles	  of	   logic	   and	   consistency	  were	   thought	   to	   free	   reason	   from	   the	   ‘arbitrary	   power	   of	   nature’s	   relations	   of	  cause	   and	   effect’	   (11).	   	   So	   for	   Kant:	   ‘Everything	   in	   nature	  works	   according	   to	  laws.	  Reasonable	  [vernunftiges]	  beings	  alone	  have	  the	  faculty	  of	  acting	  according	  
to	   the	   conception	   of	   laws,	   that	   is	   according	   to	  principles,	   i.e.	   have	  a	  will’	   (Kant,	  
Groundwork,	  40;	  Meyer,	  11).	  Once	  the	  will	  is	  freed	  of	  the	  impulses	  of	  nature,	  its	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actions	  can	  be	  made	  to	  conform	  to	  a	  universal	  law.	  From	  this	  is	  derived	  the	  first	  categorical	   imperative	  of	  always	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  reason.	  Once	  reason	  is	  universal	  and	  an	  end	  in	  itself,	  and	  like	  cases	  are	  treated	  alike	  –	  we	  can	  move	  to	  the	   second	  categorical	   imperative	   that	   reason	   in	  oneself	   or	  others	   is	   an	  end	   in	  itself	  and	  not	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end	  (12).	  Reason	  then	  becomes	  the	  basis	  of	  freedom,	  responsibility,	  and	  community	  (12).	  An	  ethical	  state	  and	  harmonious	  community	  are	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reason	  and	  its	  ‘kingdom	  of	  ends’	  (13).	  	   Kant’s	  account	  of	  judgment	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  conviction	  that	  reason	  is	  an	  assumption	  –	  and	  that	  the	  gap	  between	  reason	  and	  nature	  needed	  to	  be	  bridged.	  The	  application	  of	  rational	  principles	  to	  the	  world	  is	  what	  Kant	  called	  ‘judgment’	  (17).	  This	  judgment	  cannot	  be	  brought	  under	  a	  rule	  –	  for	  if	  it	  were	  a	  rule	  it	  would	  in	  turn	  demand	  guidance	  from	  judgment	  (17).	  Judgment	  is	  thus	  a	  practiced	  talent	  and	   cannot	   be	   taught	   (18).	   Imagination	   is	   an	   ‘arresting	   faculty’	   that	  makes	   us	  ‘passive’	  so	  we	  can	  have	  the	  space	  to	  take	  in	  the	  world	  when	  making	  a	  judgment:	  	  ‘Our	  desire	  for	  order,	  pattern,	  form,	  and	  simplicity,	  for	  a	  world	  that	  makes	  sense	   as	   though	   it	   were	   designed	   by	   an	   intellect	   like	   our	   own,	   is	   the	  aesthetic	   core	   of	   judgment.	   Kant	   notes	   that	   when	   we	   discover	   such	  unities,	  we	  experience	  spontaneous	  pleasure	  and	  satisfaction,	  common	  to	  all	  human	  beings’	  (19).	  	  The	  sublime,	  the	  sense	  of	  awe,	  ‘the	  feeling	  of	  disjunction	  between	  ourselves	  and	  the	   world,	   the	   feeling	   of	   not	   being	   at	   home	   in	   the	   world,	   the	   feeling	   that	   the	  world	   is	   beyond	   our	   power	   to	   comprehend’	   (22)	   gives	   us	   an	   intimation	   of	  infinity.	  We	  can	  intuit	  this	  idea	  even	  though	  we	  cannot	  experience	  or	  understand	  it.	  Justice	  is	  an	  encounter	  with	  this	  sublime	  but	  it	  ‘evades	  our	  grasp’	  (23).	  	   Meyer	  claims	  that	  we	  need	  an	  account	  of	  the	  ‘we’	  in	  order	  to	  care	  for	  the	  merely	  finite	  ‘human’	  (24).	  This	  account	  of	  the	  ‘we’	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  a	  problem	  of	  origin	   and	   inauguration	  as	   I	  pointed	  out	   above.	  The	  Constitutional	  order,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   approach	   to	   reconciliation,	   mercy,	   and	   forgiveness	   adopted	   at	   the	  time	   of	   transition	  were	   grounded	  with	   a	   view	   to	   a	   community	   that	  was	   yet	   to	  come.	   But	   it	   was	   not	   without	   a	   specifically	   African	   or	   Bantu	   inflection	   in	   that	  ubuntu	  was	   placed	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   ethos	   of	   reconciliation,	   as	  well	   as	   being	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central	  to	  key	  decisions	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.31	  Being-­‐with	  each	  other,	  and	  continuing	  to	  live	  as	  if	  South	  Africa	  belonged	  to	  ‘all	  who	  live	  in	  it’	  was	  central	  to	  being	  and	  becoming	  in	  post-­‐apartheid	  South	  Africa.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  Court	  in	   Albutt	   reduces	   the	   processes	   of	   amnesty	   and	   the	   work	   of	   the	   TRC	   to	   a	  participatory	   model	   and	   a	   rational	   means	   of	   accomplishing	   the	   ends	   of	  reconciliation,	   they	   distort	   the	   philosophy	   that	   informed	   the	   transition.	   They	  forget	   the	   grounds	   of	   community.	   The	   new	   constitutional	   dispensation	   was	  informed	   by	   a	   conception	   of	   community	   not	   as	   communitarian	   essence,	   but	   a	  dynamic	  form	  of	  being-­‐with	  which	  should	  continue	  to	  inform	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Court.	  	   The	  whole-­‐ness	   that	   the	   philosophy	   of	   ubuntu	   is	   supposed	   to	   inspire	   is	  not	  the	  absolute	  of	  community-­‐as-­‐law	  or	  communitarianism.	  Rather	  whole-­‐ness	  through	   ubuntu	   is	   the	   recognition	   that	   be-­‐ing	   is	   not	   fragmented	   as	   the	  subject/noun	   ‘be!’	   as	   it	   is	   in	   (some)	  western	   ontologies.32	   	   Ubuntu	   philosophy	  undoes	  the	  abstract	  human	  subject	  of	  western	  legal	  thought.33	  	  It	  eschews	  the	  re-­‐presentation	   of	   the	   subject	   as	   the	   abstract	   representation	   of	   the	   ‘subject-­‐verb-­‐object’	   structure	   of	   language/law.	   It	   does	   so	  by	  de-­‐centring	   the	  nounal	   subject	  from	  the	  fragmentation	  subject/object.	  	  African	  law:	  is	   law	   without	   a	   centre	   since	   the	   legal	   subject	   here	   is	   an	   active	   but	  transient	   participant	   in	   the	   be-­‐ing,	   that	   is,	   the	   musical	   flow	   of	   law	   …	   .	  
Ubuntu	   law	   is	   not	   only	   the	   ontology	   of	   the	   do-­‐ing	   subject.	   	   It	   is	  contemporaneously	   the	   epistemology	   of	   the	   dicern-­‐ing	   subject	  continuously	  harmonising	  the	  music	  of	  the	  universe.	  In	  this	  sense,	  ubuntu	  philosophy	  of	  law	  is	  a	  dynamology.	  Law	  here	  is	  thus	  dynamic	  because	  it	  is	  in	  the	  first	  place	  rheomodic.34	  The	  subject	  is	  then	  not	  obliged	  to	  live	  ‘within	  the	  law’	  as	  with	  the	  western	  legal	  subject,	   but	   to	   ‘live	   the	   law’.35	   	   The	   object	   of	   law	   inspired	   by	   ubuntu	   is	   to	  maintain	  equilibrium.36	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  See	  Motha,	  ‘Archiving	  Colonial	  Sovereignty:	  From	  Ubuntu	  to	  a	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Sacrifice’	  (2009)	  24	  SA	  Public	  Law	  297-­‐327.	  32	  Mogobe	  Ramose,	  African	  Philosophy	  Through	  Ubuntu,	  pp.	  46-­‐7.	  33	  Id.	  p.	  92.	  34	  Ibid.	  35	  Id.	  p.	  93	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   Drucilla	   Cornell	   and	   Karin	   van	   Marle	   have	   commented	   on	   how	   ubuntu	  might	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  interactive	  ethic	  that	  stands	  behind	  the	  law	  in	  the	  ‘new’	  South	   Africa.37	   On	   their	   account,	   ubuntu	   is	   not	   only	   an	   account	   of	   being	   or	  existence.	   	   It	   is	   also	   an	   ‘ontic	   orientation	   in	  which	  who	   and	  how	  we	   can	  be	   as	  human	  beings	  is	  always	  being	  shaped	  in	  our	  interaction	  with	  each	  other’.38	  They	  distinguish	   ubuntu	   from	   communalism	   or	   communitarianism	   –	   terms	   that	  suggest	  the	  privileging	  of	  community	  over	  the	  individual	  -­‐	  arguing	  that	  what	  is	  at	  stake	   in	   ubuntu’s	   ontic	   orientation	   is	   the	   ‘process	   of	   becoming	   a	   person’,	   and	  how	   one	   is	   given	   a	   chance	   to	   become	   a	   person.39	   This	   accords	  with	   Ramose’s	  account	  of	  ubuntu	  as	  ‘be-­‐ing	  becoming’.	  Community	  is	  then	  not	  some	  static	  entity	  ‘outside’	  the	  individual:	  ‘The	  community	  is	  only	  as	  it	  is	  continuously	  brought	  into	  being	  by	  those	  who	  “make	  it	  up”’.40	  Cornell	  and	  van	  Marle	  explain	  how	  this	  ontic	  orientation	   of	   ubuntu	   can	   be	   deployed	   so	   that	   freedom	   can	   be	   understood	   as	  indivisible.	  With	  the	  Constitutional	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Makwanyane	  in	  mind,	  they	  explain	  how	  a	  society	  that	  allows	  the	  death	  penalty	  institutionalises	  a	  form	  of	  a	  vengeance	   as	   the	   field	   in	  which	  we	  must	   all	   operate.	   A	   conception	   of	   freedom	  drawn	  from	  ubuntu	   ‘is	  not	   freedom	  from;	   it	   is	   freedom	  to	  be	  together	   in	  a	  way	  that	  enhances	  everyone’s	  capability	   to	   transform	  themselves	   in	   their	  society’.41	  Given	   ubuntu	   is	   an	   ‘ontic	   orientation	  within	   an	   interactive	   ethic,	   it	   is	   indeed	   a	  sliding	  signifier	  whose	  meaning	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  definition	  of	  good	  and	  bad	  is	  always	  being	   re-­‐evaluated	   in	   the	   context	   of	   actual	   interactions,	   as	   these	   enhance	   the	  individual’s	   and	   community’s	   powers’.42	  While	   some	  might	   call	   this	   imprecise,	  unpredictable,	  or	  a	  dangerous	  basis	  on	  which	   to	   curtail	   state	  violence	   (such	  as	  the	  death	  penalty),	  Cornell	  and	  van	  Marle	  argue	  that	  the	  ‘bloatedness	  of	  ubuntu’	  is	  actually	   its	  strength.43	   	   	   	  One	  person’s	   freedom	  may	  still	  be	  destroyed	  by	  the	  community.	  This	  will	   endure	  as	   long	  as	   long	  as	   there	  are	   competing	   freedoms,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Id.	  p.	  93-­‐94.	  37	  Cornell	  and	  van	  Marle,	  ‘Exploring	  ubuntu:	  Tentative	  Reflections’	  (2005)	  5	  African	  Human	  
Rights	  Law	  Journal	  195-­‐220	  at	  205.	  38	  Ibid.	  39	  Id.	  p.	  206.	  40	  Ibid.	  41	  Id.	  p.	  207.	  42	  Ibid.	  43	  Ibid.	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and	  especially	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  punishment.	  	  But	  ubuntu	  is	  an	  African	  principle	  of	  transcendence	   which	   provides	   a	   mode	   of	   attending	   to	   the	   moral	   fabric	   of	   an	  aspirational	  community.44	  	  	  	   Being-­‐becoming	  grounded	  on	  ubuntu	  may	  be	  a	  far	  more	  durable	  source	  of	  ensuring	  the	  participatory	  nature	  of	  a	  democracy.	  If	  embedded	  in	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  it	  might	  demand	  that	  a	  person	  in	  the	  community	  affected	  by	  a	  decision	  be	  treated	  inclusively	   before	   a	   decision	   is	   reached.	   Moreover,	   the	   persistence	   of	   the	  sovereign	   return	   as	   a	   feature	   of	   modern	   liberal	   democracy	   would	   be	  marginalised	  through	  ubuntu’s	  renunciation	  of	  the	  ipseity	  discussed	  above.	  This	  is	  the	  potential	  of	  plurality	  over	  rationality	  as	  a	  core	  value	  animating	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  	  	  
2.3	   The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  as	  Critique	  	  I	  would	  finally	  like	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  responsibility	  and	  judgment	  that	   is	  also	  provoked	  by	  the	  means-­‐end	  rationality	  posited	  in	  the	  Albutt	  case.	  If	  the	   rule	  of	   law	   is	   to	  have	   any	   teeth	   in	   the	   face	  of	   the	   sovereign	   return,	   then	   it	  must	  do	   so	  with	   a	   firm	   sense	  of	   the	  primacy	  of	   judgment	   as	   the	   response	   to	   a	  crisis.	  	  To	  be	  responsible,	  as	  I	  suggest	  here,	  is	  to	  exercise	  judgment	  as	  critique.	  	   I	   will	   not	   be	   the	   first	   to	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   something	   inherently	  restorative	  or	  re-­‐constitutive	  in	  the	  work	  of	  critique	  as	  a	  response	  to	  a	  political	  crisis	  or	  demand.	  Wendy	  Brown	  builds	  an	  argument	  for	  critical	  theory	  as	  a	  hope	  rather	  than	  a	  luxury	  in	  dark	  times.45	  Through	  a	  helpful	  etymological	  memoriam	  of	   the	   term	   ‘critique’	   which	   derives	   from	   the	   Greek	   term	   krisis,	   Brown	  disassociates	   critique	   from	   negativity,	   and	   scholasticism	   (5).	   She	   suggests	   that	  there	   could	   be	   no	   such	   thing	   as	   ‘mere’,	   ‘indulgent’,	   or	   ‘untimely’	   critique.	   In	  ancient	   Athens	   krisis	   was	   ‘a	   jurisprudential	   term	   identified	   with	   the	   art	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Cornell,	  ‘uBuntu,	  Pluralism,	  and	  the	  Responsibility	  of	  Legal	  Academics	  to	  the	  New	  South	  Africa’	  (2009)	  20:	  1	  Law	  and	  Critique	  43-­‐58	  at	  48.	  45	  W	  Brown,	  Edgework:	  Critical	  Essays	  on	  Knowledge	  and	  Politics	  (2005).	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making	   distinctions’	   (5).	   	   These	   distinctions	   were	   essential	   for	   arriving	   at	   a	  judgment	   and	   rectifying	   disorder	   in	   democracy.	   Krisis	   was	   a	   scene	   where	   the	  object,	  agent,	  and	  process	  for	  judging	  were	  intermingled	  as	  the	  defendant	  might	  at	  once	  be	  a	  citizen	  and	  member	  of	  the	  Senate:	  ‘Procedurally,	  juridical	  krisis	  thus	  consisted	  of	  recognising	  an	  objective	  crisis	  and	  convening	  subjective	  critics	  who	  then	   passed	   a	   critical	   judgment	   and	   provided	   a	   formula	   for	   restorative	   action’	  (5).	   	   This	   is	   a	   far	   cry	   from	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   critic	   as	   disinterested,	   or	   radically	  opposed	  to	  the	  system	  or	  social	  organisation.	  There	  are	  of	  course	  many	  political	  and	   philosophical	   reasons	   to	   be	   suspicious	   of	   critique	   as	   the	   restoration	   of	   a	  fractured	  or	  adulterated	  whole.	  But	  we	  still	   cannot	  get	  away,	   as	  Brown	   insists,	  from	  the	  task	  of	  distinguishing	  ‘true	  from	  false,	  genuine	  from	  spurious,	  beautiful	  from	  ugly,	  right	  from	  wrong’.	  We	  weigh	  pros	  and	  cons,	  we	  judge	  evidence	  –	  that	  is	   to	  say,	  we	  deliberate.	  So	   judgment,	  distinction,	  and	  deliberation	  are	  essential	  aspects	  of	  critique.	  	  	  Can	  critique	  ever	  be	  untimely?	  Does	  it	  renew	  the	  time	  that	  calls	  it	  forth?	  Does	   it	   go	   past	   the	   event,	   the	   crisis	   that	  was	   the	   instance	   of	   critique?	   	   Brown	  eschews	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘untimely	   critique’,	   and	   affirms	   a	   critical	   enterprise	  directed	   at	   ‘setting	   the	   times	   right	   again’,	   for	   instance	   by	   repairing	   a	   ‘tear	   in	  justice’	   (6).	   In	   this	  mode	   there	   is	  a	   clear	   restorative	  element	   to	  critique	  –	  a	   re-­‐pairing	   that	   would	   sit	   comfortably	   with	   the	   exigencies	   of	   ubuntu	   discussed	  above.	  The	  very	  possibility	   of	   going	   forward	  demands	   that	   the	   contours	  of	   the	  crisis	  be	  articulated,	  that	  it	  be	  inscribed	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  justice.	  Critique	  is	  then	  the	   response,	   the	   gesture,	   however	   imperfect	   and	   unjust,	   that	   decides	   and	  distinguishes	   between	   a	   variety	   of	   infinite	   responses.	   	   With	   the	   force	   of	   a	  (critical)	  distinction,	   the	   finding	  and	   inscribing	  of	  a	  difference,	   time	   is	  adjusted	  and	  a	  new	  condition	  of	  plurality	   is	  made	  possible.	   	  We	  know	  from	  Derrida	  that	  these	   adjustments,	   these	   legal	   or	   other	   decisions	   are	   always	   already	   unjust,	  deconstructable.46	  But	  the	  finitude	  of	  the	  event	  of	  critique	  exposes	  the	  crisis,	  the	  tear	   in	   justice.	   The	   time	   of	   judgment	   as	   critique	   is,	   then,	   at	   once	   finite	   and	  infinite.	   The	   impossibility	   of	   a	   just	   response	   (a	   tear	   in	   justice	   that	   cannot	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  “The	  Force	  of	  Law:	  The	  Mystical	  Foundations	  of	  Authority”	  in	  Gil	  Nidjar	  (ed.)	  
Acts	  of	  Religion	  (2001).	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repaired),	  renews	  critique	  through	  the	  permanence	  of	   the	  crisis,	   the	   ‘again	  and	  again’,	  which	  marks	  the	  enormity	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  justice.	  	  Also	  at	  stake	  in	  critique	  is	  the	  status	  of	  the	  critic,	  and	  her	  relationship	  to	  the	   order	   that	   has	   fallen	   into	   crisis.	   This	   also	   entails	   a	   move	   away	   from	   the	  narrowly	   adjudicatory	   sense	   of	   critique.	   	   Critique	   entails	   a	   spatial	   dimension	  here	  –	   it	   is	  a	  matter	  of	   ‘critical	  distance’	   from	  the	  object	  of	  critique.	  Socrates	   is	  the	  early	  model	  that	  Brown	  invokes	  –	  a	  critic	  who	  distanced	  himself	  and	  the	  task	  of	  discerning	   individual	  virtue	  and	  political	   justice	   from	  the	  domain	  of	  political	  and	  judicial	  institutions.	  In	  contemporary	  traces	  of	  the	  old	  usage	  of	  critique	  there	  is	  still:	  	  sustained	   linking	  of	   the	   objective	   and	   subjective	  dimensions	   of	   critique,	  the	  ways	   in	  which	  a	  worldly	  event	  or	  phenomenon,	  whether	  a	  collapsed	  empire	   or	   a	   diseased	   body,	   connects	   a	   specific	   condition	   with	   an	  immediate	   need	   to	   comprehend	   by	   sifting,	   sorting,	   or	   separating	   its	  elements,	  to	  judge,	  and	  to	  respond	  to	  it.	  (7)	  While	  this	  quality	  of	  repair	  and	  restoration,	  sorting	  and	  separating,	  may	  seem	  to	  pull	  the	  radical	  edge	  out	  of	  critique,	  what	  Brown	  takes	  away	  from	  it	  is	  the	  sense	  of	   urgency,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   response	   to	   the	   crisis	   is	   not	   optional.	  What	   she	  seeks	   to	   establish	   is	   that	   critique	   is	   not	  merely	   negative	   or	   academic,	   nor	   is	   it	  dependent	  on	  some	  regime	  of	  transcendent	  Truth.	  	  	  	   But	   is	   critique	   as	   Brown	   renders	   it	   too	   readily	   posed	   in	   a	   juridical	  grammar,	  and	  too	  redolent	  of	  seeking	  a	  (desperate)	  political	  restoration?	  Can	  a	  body	  of	   law,	  the	  body	  before	  the	  law,	  or	  the	  body	  politic	  be	  so	  readily	  restored	  through	   the	   devices	   and	   practices	   of	   critique	   as	   judgment?	   	   And	   if	   we	   are	   to	  eschew	  the	  juridico-­‐political	  grammar	  of	  critique,	  why	  do	  we	  do	  this?	  	  And	  who	  is	   this	   ‘we’?	   	  Who	   is	   the	   agent	   of	   critique	  beyond	   critique	   as	   adjudication,	   and	  what	  does	  she	  seek?	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  in	  taking	  up	  these	  questions	  we	  must	  direct	  attention	  to	  the	  instance	  of	  critique,	  to	  the	  event	  that	  calls	  forth	  the	  critical	  response.	   It	   is	   the	   singularity	   of	   this	   event	   that	   drives	   the	   critical	   encounter,	  informs	  its	  ethics,	  and	  demands	  a	  politics	  which	  cannot	  be	  legislated	  in	  advance.	  	  
DRAFT	  –	  forthcoming	  in	  Constitutional	  Court	  Review	   26	  
3	   Conclusion	  	  The	  instance	  of	  the	  pardon,	  the	  problem	  of	  mercy,	  the	  infinite	  calculation	  that	   might	   have	   been	   open	   to	   the	   President	   in	   exercising	   his	   power	   draws	  attention	  to	  a	  polity	  in	  crisis.	  	  The	  sovereign	  return	  was	  no	  arbitrary	  exercise	  of	  a	  gratuitous	  will,	  but	  the	  response	  to	  a	  tear	  in	  justice.	  In	  this	  essay	  I	  have	  argued	  that	   the	  means-­‐end	  approach	  to	  rationality	  as	   the	  rule	  of	   law’s	  response	  to	   the	  people	  excluded	  from	  the	  President’s	  deliberations	  hardly	  addresses	  the	  crisis	  of	  democracy	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   this	  problem.	  A	  participatory	  democracy	  will	  always	  have	  the	  problem	  of	  who	  counts,	  how	  many	  will	  be	  counted,	  who	  will	  be	  heard.	  I	  have	   characterized	   this	   as	   the	   problem	   of	   ipseity	   or	   the	   eternal	   return	   of	   the	  sovereign.	   In	   responding	   to	   this	   crisis	   I	   have	   suggested	   that	   an	   alternative	  approach	   to	   plurality	   can	   ground	   a	   critical	   judgment	   on	   what	   it	   means	   to	  respond	  to	  this	  crisis.	  	  	  	  	  
